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This paper uses project and household data to examine the ability of 100 or so 
public works projects in Western Cape Province, South Africa, to target benefits—both 
direct and indirect—to those living below the poverty line. We find that public works 
projects generally outperform hypothetical untargeted cash transfers in this regard under 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In the developing world, most best-practice national strategies to reduce poverty 
include workfare programs (World Bank 2000). The receipt of benefits from such 
programs is contingent on the preparedness of beneficiaries to work. Typically they 
comprise of public works schemes that involve the creation of physical assets at below 
market wages. Such initiatives attempt to create physical assets in a labor-intensive way 
so that as much employment is generated as possible. To increase the poverty-reducing 
impact, an attempt is made to generate assets—both physical and human—that benefit 
the poor in the medium to long run (Subbarao 1997).
1 
Despite these goals, this type of antipoverty intervention has not escaped the 
general skepticism faced by targeted programs in general (see some of the case-studies in 
van de Walle and Nead [1995], for example). Can the programs be sufficiently well 
targeted to generate additional employment rather than substitute for market-led 
employment? Will the administrative requirements of the programs consume too many of 
the resources? Can high-quality assets be generated in a fashion that is sufficiently labor-
intensive to generate sufficient income for the poor? These are just some of the questions 
posed by the critics.  
 
                                                 
1  Workfare programs in the developing world are unlike those introduced in the United States and the 
United Kingdom in the1990s. The latter require a gradual substitution of income transfers with income 
from market-based employment. In general in the developing world, and in South Africa in particular, 
workfare programs are additional to a given set of social policy initiatives. Good starting points on the 
impacts of work to welfare programs in the U.S. and the U.K. are offered by Haveman and Wolfe (2000), 
Mills, Alwang, and Hazarika (2000), and Peck and Theodore (2000). 2 
To date, the data to address these questions have not been available. This paper 
exploits a new data set from South Africa to do so. Unemployment and poverty are major 
problems in South Africa. Thirty percent of working age South Africans are unemployed 
(Klasen 1997).
2 For individuals in the poorest 20 percent of households, the rate is 53 
percent. In 1993, 9,000 households nationwide were asked, “what in your opinion could 
government do to most help this household improve its living conditions?” From a list of 
18 items, the top selection was “jobs.” Moreover, “jobs” (i.e., job creation) was the 
number one issue in all three regions: rural, urban, and metropolitan, as well as for the 
Western Cape Province in which this study is located (PSLSD 1994; Klasen 1997). 
In response to these problems, a National Public Works Programme (NPWP) was 
established in 1994. The objectives of the program are to (1) create, rehabilitate, and 
maintain physical assets that meet the basic needs of the poor and promote broader 
economic activity, (2) reduce unemployment through the creation of productive jobs, 
(3) educate and train those on the program as a means of “economic empowerment,” and 
build the capacity of communities to manage their own affairs (NEF 1994a, 1994b). 
This paper analyses project-level data collected by the authors in the South 
African province of the Western Cape. Specifically information on 101 NPWP-like 
public works projects undertaken in the province during the 1995-97 period is merged 
with household survey data from the 25 magisterial districts in which the projects were 
based. We employ and extend a framework first put forward by Ravallion (1999) to 
                                                 
2 Unemployment is defined as “all people not working who would like to work and are actively seeking 
work or have given up looking" (Klasen 1997, 69). 3 
estimate the rands of public expenditure necessary to transfer one rand of resources to the 
poor. We then compare this ratio to that generated by a hypothetical untargeted transfer 
under a range of assumptions about parameter values. We find that the vast majority of 
public works programs outperform the benchmark by some considerable distance over a 
wide range of parameter scenarios. 
 
2. THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
How do we assess the ability of public works programs to transfer benefits to the 
poor? Ultimately we want to know how many rands of public funds it takes to transfer 
one rand to a poor worker. Projects that use less public funds to transfer one rand to the 
poor than other projects are more cost-efficient. What makes them more cost-efficient? 
Moreover, how do the public works projects compare with pure transfer programs? To 
help us answer these questions for our 101 projects, we use the analytical framework laid 
out in Ravallion (1999) as a starting point.  
First, define the following: 
 
G  =  government spending on public works, 
C  =  private co-financing, 
W  =  wage bill to poor workers on public works project, 
L  =  wage bill leaked to nonpoor workers on project, 
IB  =  nontransfer or indirect benefits to the poor, and 4 




  P*  =  the probability of the poor worker getting a job, in absence of project,  
  P  =  the probability of a poor worker finding work while working on the 
project, and 
 
  W*  =  the wage rate of poor workers in the absence of the project.  
 
The wages earned by poor workers in the absence of the project are P*W*. In the 
presence of the project, poor workers earn (1-P)W + PW*.  
The net wage gain to the poor, NW, is  
(1-P)W + PW* - P*W* 
or 
(1-P)W -(P* - P)W* . 
 
The total benefits to the poor, B, become NW + IB, and the total nontransfer or 
indirect benefits, SB = IB + IBNP. 
Using these components, we can define 
labor intensity  =  (W + L)/(G + C), 
percent of earnings to poor  =  W/(W + L), 
the benefit to cost ratio  =  SB/(G + C), and 
the rands (from government) cost per unit of 
  rand benefit to poor  =  G/B. 5 
The lower the G/B, the more efficient transfer mechanism the public works 
project is for the poor, at least in terms of government outlays. In general, one might 
expect G/B to decline with (1) increased labor intensity (high (W + L)/(G + C)), 
(2) improved targeting performance (high W/(W + L)), (3) large new wage gains (large 
NW/W), (4) a large proportion of the indirect benefits to the poor (large IB/SB), and 
(5) the ability of public funds to leverage other funds (high (G + C)/G). However, the 
trade-offs between these components are complex. For example, a labor intensity that is 
too high might reduce the ability of the project to generate indirect benefits (a vegetation 
clearing program versus a road clearing program) that are important for the poor as well 
as the nonpoor. 
 
3. DATA AND VARIABLES 
The study focuses on seven public works programs containing 101 completed 
public works projects in the Western Cape Province—one of nine provinces in South 
Africa. Together, the 101 projects in the seven programs represent a census of all labor-
intensive public works projects initiated and completed in the two-year period from 1995 
to 1997. There are more than seven public works programs in the Western Cape 
Province, but only seven have been initiated since 1993 with a set of objectives that 
mirror those of the NPWP, and they are profiled in Appendix Table 6. 
Using project documents, and mail-in questionnaires with follow-up telephone 
calls and visits, quantitative and qualitative data were collected for each project in terms 6 
of location, type of asset created, cost structure, duration, employment days generated, 
wage rates offered, and type of implementing arrangement (Adato et al. 1999). Initially, 
all program-level documents were identified for each of the seven programs (monthly 
reports, final project close-out reports, project review summaries, etc.). However, it was 
soon determined that these documents either (1) contained data taken from project 
applications and did not reflect actual data collected during project implementation; 
(2) were incomplete, existing for some projects and not for others, and/or containing 
certain pieces of data for some projects and not for others; or (3) contained data that were 
of questionable origin or were contradictory. Thus, in order to get accurate data, a 
project-level questionnaire was designed and administered to implementing agents for 
each project. In many cases, the implementing agent did not have the data and many 
visits had to be made to a wide range of program and project administrators or managers, 
consultants, contractors, and accountants.  
The project-level data were merged at the district level with district-level averages 
from the 1995 October Household Surveys (CSS 1998) conducted by the Government’s 
Central Statistics Service. District-level variables include average income per capita, the 
standard deviation of per capita income within district, the headcount poverty rate, the 
unemployment rate (using the broad definition as in Klasen 1997), the wage rates of 
unskilled manual labor, and the percentage of individuals with at least a standard 10 
education. Using these data, the variables outlined in Section 2 were constructed. Bearing 
in mind that we want to calculate G/B for each project, we first explain the assumptions 
behind our chosen values of the components of G/B.  7 
Government spending on public works (G). This is collected directly from project 
records and verified with government records whenever possible. It consists of a 
combination of national, provincial, and local government spending. The range of per 
project government expenditure runs from 14,000 rands to 34 million rands. The median 
value is approximately 340,000 rands. 
Private co-financing (C). We only have information on planned (as opposed to 
actual) co-financing. We use “planned private co-financing” as a proxy for actual private 
co-financing. Twenty-four projects have a nonzero value for C. 
Wage bill leaked to nonpoor workers on project (L). It would have been a very 
large task to survey enough participating and nonparticipating individuals at each of the 
101 project sites to determine the leakage of the wage benefits to the nonpoor on a 
project-by-project basis. Instead, we estimated this leakage as follows. For the 79 projects 
where the project wage was lower than the district wage for similar unskilled work 
(obtained from the OHS 1995 data, with appropriate cost-of-living adjustments for the 
date of project initiation), we assumed no leakage to the poor. For the 22 projects that set 
wages above the area wage for a similar task, we assume that leakage to the nonpoor is 
greater than zero. Specifically for 9 projects in districts that have a low variability in 
household per capita income (standard deviation of income below an arbitrarily 
determined 60th percentile cutoff), we assume leakage to the nonpoor is 10 percent. For 
the remaining 13 projects, we assume leakage is 20 percent. We recognize that these 
cutoffs and numbers are entirely arbitrary, but they seem to be in line with the general 8 
consensus as to how large these numbers are in a middle-income country such as South 
Africa (Subbarao et al. 1996).  
The probability of the worker getting a job, in absence of program (P*). Most of 
the unemployed individuals in South Africa have not had work for a long time. This is 
confirmed by the OHS 1995 survey. For all those who have not worked in the 7 days 
prior to the survey, did not have their own business, and would accept a suitable job if 
offered, the length of time they reported they had been looking for work varied from 3 to 
25 months (median = 17). We use the inverse of the average search length in the district 
as the probability of finding a job in the absence of the project. 
Public works project wage bill (W). This is collected directly from project records 
and is equivalent to the wage costs to workers.  
The wage bill of the workers in a job, in absence of program (W*). This is 
estimated as the number of days of employment generated by the project (as derived from 
project records) multiplied by the area wage for similar unskilled work.  
The probability of finding nonproject work while working on the program (P). For 
7 of the 101 completed projects, we conducted surveys of a random selection of former 
project employees. In all, 193 former employees were asked the question, “was any new 
work related to the type of work on the project?” Of these individuals, 12 (or just over 6 
percent) responded “yes” to this question. Hence, we estimate P as 0.06 for all projects, 
which, based on qualitative data from the seven case-study projects, is probably a 
conservative estimate. 9 
Nontransfer Benefits (SB). This component of the cost-effectiveness analysis is by 
far the most complicated to generate without a detailed project-by-project full impact 
evaluation. We could not find estimates on the nontransfer benefits generated by public 
works projects in the literature. The World Bank (1994) has published some estimates of 
the rates of return on various types of infrastructure projects from around the world, but it 
is difficult to generate a benefit stream from this information for well-known reasons, 
including the non-uniqueness of the internal rate of return that equates the net present 
value of a benefit stream to zero. Based on an analysis of the Employment Guarantee 
Scheme in Maharashtra, India, Ravallion and Datt (1995) consider a level of Aindirect 
benefits@ (such as the increased demand for rural labor and the value of the infrastructure) 
of 40 percent of the costs of a project to be reasonable. 
For our calculations we use the standard Little and Mirrlees (1974) approach 
whereby 
 
  P = aW - [W - l(W - W*P*)], 
 
where W, W*, and P* are defined as above; P = the net benefits from an investment 
(what Ravallion [1999] terms “the non-transfer benefits”); aW = the value to society of 
the output produced, and [W - l(W - W*P*)] is the cost to society of the investment. Note 
that the costs to society comprise the immediate costs W minus by the output gain from 
redeploying labor (W - W*P*) weighted by a factor l. Note that W - W*P* is identical to 10 
NW when P, the probability of a poor worker finding work while working on the project, 
is zero.  
The output gain is weighted by l, which one can interpret as the social value of 
the income gain to the workers from funds extracted from richer income individuals 
(from taxes, for example). l can be thought of as 
 






m is the average income of those from who government resources are drawn, Y
w is 
the average income of the public works workers, and e is a weight given to differences in 
Y
m and Y
w. For example, if (Y
m/Y
w) = 2 and e = 1, then l = 2. When e = 1, we value the 
transfer to workers in direct proportion to (Y
m/Y
w). The larger the difference between Y
m 
and Y
w , the larger is l for a given e.  
We calculate SB for each project by using W, W*, P*, and P. We assume e = 1 
and generate l for each project as the ratio of 2,500 rands/month/capita (our proxy for 
Y
m) to the district average per capita monthly income (which ranges from 258 to 3,183) 
(our proxy for Y
w). We have to make assumption about Y
m and Y
w as we do not have 
income levels of workers in the projects, nor do we have the income levels of taxpayers. 
Our guesses about Y
w are probably overestimates of the income of workers. As to our 
assumption of 2,500 rand per month per capita as the average income of taxpayers in the 
Western Cape Province (Y
m), this is approximately twice the provincial average income 
(PSLSD 1994).  11 
To generate a for each project, we rely on qualitative data that we collected on a 
project-by-project basis as to the community’s perceptions about the value to them of the 
assets created by the project. One can think of a as the return on the investment W. 
Communities were asked to assess the wider value to the community of the asset 
generated (and the process by which it was generated) and to classify the generation of 
asset in three grades: no broader value mentioned, one broader value mentioned, broader 
value mentioned twice. Examples of such broader uses include future income generation 
from assets, community empowerment, and the development of small contractors in the 
area. For the first group, a was assumed to be 1.0, and for the second two responses, 1.1 
and 1.2, respectively. These seem like reasonable rates of return, but they are chosen 
arbitrarily. For 20 of the CEP/IDT projects, we were unable to obtain this information. 
For the remaining 79 projects, 32 did not identify a broad effect, 39 identified one, and 10 
identified two. We assigned the 20 CEP/IDT projects a value for a identical to the 
average of the CBPWP (1.0778)—a program with similar goals in terms of community 
participation.  
Once the nontransfer benefits are estimated, they are allocated to the poor and 
nonpoor by the district poverty rate. If, for example, the proportion of the district 
population below the poverty line is 30 percent, then 30 percent of the nontransfer 
benefits are allocated to the poor. The nontransfer benefits to the poor (IB) are then added 
to the direct benefits to the poor (the value of the net transfer increase, NW) to give the 
total benefit to the poor (B). This is then compared to the government’s contribution to 12 
the cost of the public works project (G), to estimate the cost per public rand of benefit 
transferred to the poor: G/B. 
 
4. RESULTS 
First, we present estimates of some of the key variables that contribute to the 
calculation of G/B. We then present G/B for e = 1,2 (the sensitivity to income transfers 
from rich to poor) and compare it to the cost of transferring a rand to the poor with a 
hypothetical transfer program for the district that the public works program is contained 
in. Finally, we make the untargeted transfer less efficient in that we impose an 
administrative charge that increases the cost of transferring one rand to the poor by 20 
percent. 
Table 1 describes some of the variables we outlined in earlier sections. A number 
of things are worth noting here. First, the public works wage bill to the poor (W) is, on  
 
Table 1: Components of project performance 
Variable  Mean  Minimum  Maximum  N 
         
Wage bill to poor from the project (W)    380,616    6,600    3,158,700  101 
Wage bill to nonpoor from project (L)     21,265    0    522,738  101 
Wage earnings, poor, no program (W*)     473,725    8,711    4,520,471  101 
Probability of wages without project (P*)    0.09    0.04    0.33  101 
Government costs of project (G)     1,614,258    14,928    34,993,046  101 
Costs co-financed by nongovernment (C)    18,186    0    430,000  101 
Net wage benefit to poor (NW)     351,488    6,065    2,976,840  101 
Net wage/wage bill (NW/W)    0.90    0.56    0.98  101 
 13 
average, lower than the wages that workers could have earned if they had guarantees of 
full employment in the absence of the project (W*). However, the mean expected 
probability of gaining employment in the absence of the program (P*) is 0.09; hence, the 
expected value of earnings in the absence of the project is much lower than in the 
presence of the projects. Second, note the low level of leakage to the nonpoor (L), which 
represents about 4-5 percent of the total wage bill. This seems low, but recall that 79 of 
the 101 projects offer wages lower than the comparable unskilled area wage. Third, the 
costs of the projects borne by nongovernmental sources (C) are low, at least based on 
planned contributions. Fourth, note that the net wage bill to the poor as a proportion of 
the wage bill to the poor (NW/W) is 0.9 at the mean. This reflects the low value for P*. 
As Ravallion (1999) notes, this ratio is often assumed to be 1.0, although our mean 
estimates are higher than those estimated by Ravallion and Datt (1995) for the 
Employment Guarantee Scheme. Their study finds that the opportunity cost of 
participation by the poor in the program is one-quarter of the gross wage earnings of the 
scheme; in other words, they estimate NW/W as 0.75. 
  Table 2 provides a breakdown of these numbers by program. First, note that the 
two least labor-intensive programs are PILOT and TRANSPORT, which are both 
involved in road construction. The most labor-intensive programs are the C & G and 
WFW—neither of which involves large-scale infrastructure construction. Second, note 
the different sizes of programs in terms of the average wage bill to poor workers, W, with 
the WFW program being the largest. So there is much variation in activity and scale 
 14 















































                   
C & G  90,453  5,412  148,053  0.07  166,902  22,442  46  84,508    10 
CBPWP  108,780  6,436  119,021  0.09  577,856  3,056  27  99,769    18 
CEP/IDT  54,771  1,796  94,988  0.11  187,520  13,013  31  46,636    22 
WFW  1,643,514  114,588  1,828,173  0.09  2,366,540  0  86  1,516,987    14 
PILOT  626,265  0  1,159,015  0.04  4,993,744  0  13  610,088    2 
TRANSP  457,512  16,822  539,452  0.07  10,522,935  0  11  430,845    6 
NEF  254,067  8,038  378,773  0.08  1,399,569  43,830  36  234,148    29 
All  380,616  21,265  473,725  0.09  1,614,258  18,186  39  351,488    101 
 
 
between the programs. Third, we can see that some programs—CBPWP, CEP/IDT, 
C & G, and NEF—have been able to raise private funds.  
Table 3 presents estimates of the nontransfer benefits at values of e = 1, 2 and for 
different overhead rates for the untargeted transfer. From the first panel of Table 4 (e = 1, 
zero overhead), we can see that, on average, nontransfer benefits comprise just under half 
of the benefits to the poor (300,550/652,038). This ratio will tend to be higher for the 
programs that locate in poorer districts, since this is our rule for allocating nontransfer 
benefits to the poor and nonpoor.  
  The average cost of directing one rand to the poor ranges from 0.81 to 28.83. 
Given the assumptions in this panel of the table, 83 percent of the 101 public works 
programs deliver one rand to the poor more efficiently than does the hypothetical 
untargeted program. The WFW, C & G, CEP/IDT, and PILOT programs are particularly 15 
Table 3: Project performance by program, e e=1,2, overhead=0, 20% 
 
Proportion of PW 
projects that 
outperform untargeted 
















to give 1 
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e = 1 
 
  C & G    53,051    137,559    2.27    13.44  1.00  1.00    10 
  CBPWP    40,584    140,353    4.26    7.79  0.83  0.89    18 
  CEP/IDT    46,607    93,243    2.37    4.22  0.86  0.95    22 
  WFW   1,401,559   2,918,547    0.81    4.50  1.00  1.00    14 
  PILOT    919,010   1,529,098    3.15    3.64  1.00  1.00    2 
  TRANSP    200,581    631,426    28.83    7.11  0.33  0.33    6 
  NEF    186,408    420,556    3.20    6.35  0.76  0.79    29 
  All    300,550    652,038    4.31    6.58  0.83  0.87    101 
 
e = 2 
 
  C & G    105,490    189,997    2.06    13.44  1.00  1.00    10 
  CBPWP    80,216    179,985    3.38    7.79  0.89  0.89    18 
  CEP/IDT    92,086    138,721    1.75    4.22  0.95  0.95    22 
  WFW   2,777,758   4,294,745    0.59    4.50  1.00  1.00    14 
  PILOT   1,819,918   2,430,006    1.98    3.64  1.00  1.00    2 
  TRANSP    398,187    829,031    26.39    7.11  0.33  0.33    6 
  NEF    366,929    601,077    2.52    6.35  0.86  0.97    29 
  All    594,883    946,371    3.60    6.58  0.89  0.92    101 
 
 
efficient in delivering benefits to the poor, at least in an absolute sense. The exception is 
the TRANSPORT program, which delivers resources to the poor in a relatively expensive 
way, on average (although 2 of its 6 projects still manage to do so more effectively than 
the hypothetical untargeted program). Note that this G/B ratio is less than one for the 
WFW projects. This means that they generate a benefit stream that is larger than the 16 
government resources used in the project. We will explore the components of project 
performance later in this section. 
In a relative sense, which programs seem to be doing best in terms of 
outperforming the untargeted program in their district? Still from the first panel of Table 
3 we can see that the cost of delivering one rand in an untargeted program varies more by 
program location than does the cost of transferring one rand to the poor by the public 
works project. For example, the C & G projects are poorly targeted at the district level in 
the sense that they are located in districts that have a relatively low poverty rate (7.44 
percent); hence, it costs 13.44 rands to deliver one rand to the poor. Conversely, the 
PILOT projects are situated in districts that have a poverty rate of 27.47 percent; hence, it 
costs 3.64 rands to deliver one rand to the poor. This logic might lead the reader to think 
that public works projects should therefore locate in low poverty areas, where universal 
untargeted schemes are not cost-effective interventions. However, the location of projects 
outside of poor and high unemployment areas will reduce the performance of the public 
works projects, as we shall see.  
When the overhead rate is raised from zero to 20 percent in panel 2, the 
untargeted transfer becomes less efficient and the public works projects become more 
competitive. Now 87 percent of them deliver a rand to the poor more effectively than a 
hypothetical untargeted transfer. In the third panel, e = 2. This increases the nontransfer 
benefits in total, and hence the absolute amount to the poor. Nontransfer benefits now 
comprise over 60 percent of the benefits to the poor (594,883/946,371). This assumption 17 
makes the public works more competitive, with 89 percent of them being more efficient 
transfer mechanisms for the poor. An assumption of a 20 percent overhead on the 
untargeted transfer results in 92 percent of the projects outperforming the untargeted 
transfers.  
Why, then, are some programs more efficient in transferring one rand to the poor? 
Table 4 selects the scenario with the e = 1, and a 20 percent overhead on the untargeted 
transfer program. In this situation, the WFW, C & G, and PILOT projects do the best, 
with all of their 26 projects outperforming the hypothetical untargeted transfer. Why is 
this? Table 4 offers some clues.  
 






















































                     
C & G  3.00  0.46  0.93   16.12  1.04  2.54  13.4    2.27  1.00    10 
CBPWP  5.56  0.27  0.90    9.34  1.08  2.47  1.04    4.26  0.89    18 
CEP/IDT  2.27  0.31  0.87    5.06  1.08  3.16  7.24    2.37  0.95    22 
WFW  7.14  0.86  0.91    5.40  1.06  3.82  0.00    0.81  1.00    14 
PILOT  0.00  0.13  0.97    4.36  1.10  5.37  0.00    3.15  1.00    2 
TRANSP  5.00  0.11  0.93    8.53  1.05  2.25  0.00   28.83  0.33    6 
NEF  1.38  0.36  0.91    7.61  1.09  3.43  7.86    3.20  0.79    29 
  All  3.47  0.39  0.90    7.89  1.07  3.13  5.35    4.31  0.87    101 
 
 
First, the low leakage of benefits to the nonpoor for the C & G, PILOT, and NEF 
projects is a reflection (by construction) of their ability to offer wages below comparable 18 
area wages. The WFW projects do less well in setting wages below market, but they are 
very labor-intensive, hence ensuring that the poor will receive a sizeable transfer, no 
matter the magnitude of the nontransfer benefits or the percent of the latter that are 
captured by the nonpoor. It is important to note, however, that other projects that perform 
well against the untargeted transfer have much lower labor intensities. This is our second 
point: a project does not have to be labor-intensive to be an effective transfer mechanism 
to the poor, but it helps, up to a point. A project that does not generate an asset that is of 
value to the poor in the community will have a small value of a and therefore a smaller 
nontransfer component, all things being equal.  
Third, a large net transfer benefit is generated by locating a project in a high 
unemployment area and by offering a wage that is not too low. If the area is not a high 
unemployment area, the value of nonproject employment lost due to the existence of the 
project will be high. Moreover, if the project wage is set too low, the benefit from 
working on the project will be minimal and the project could become, or be seen to 
become, exploitative. If the wage is too high, however, leakage to the nonpoor occurs. 
Project location in a high unemployment area will boost NW, but because poverty and 
unemployment are correlated, untargeted programs in such districts will be more efficient 
than in other districts. Hence projects located in areas that boost NW have to work harder 
to outperform the untargeted programs. This is the fourth point: that good targeting 
implies trade-offs in transfer efficiency vis-à-vis an untargeted transfer. Fifth, our 
measure of returns to the community of the asset, a, varies by program. As indicated 19 
above, it tends to be smaller for the more labor-intensive projects of the C & G and WFW 
programs. A smaller a will mean lower nontransfer benefits. Sixth, our measure of the 
value of transferring one rand from taxpayer to the poor, l, is another parameter that is 
affected by project location. For the PILOT programs, it has a high value, reflecting their 
location in poorer areas. This is also reflected in a low value of L for these projects and a 
high NW/W, but it also means that untargeted transfers are efficient in the districts in 
which the two PILOT projects operate. Seventh, the C & G, NEF, and CEP/IDT projects 
do fairly well in terms of raising funding outside of government, and this will boost B/G, 
all things equal.  
The PILOT and TRANSPORT projects present an example of the complexities 
involved in assessing these programs. From Table 4, we can see that they are both road 
and stormwater programs, but the former is the fourth most efficient transfer mechanism 
(3.15 rands per rand) and the latter is by far the most inefficient (28.83 rands per rand). 
Why the difference? First, the PILOT projects offer wages below market wage (a low L); 
second, they locate in high unemployment areas (low P* and hence a higher NW); third, 
they locate in high poverty areas (high l and hence higher nontransfer benefits); and 
fourth, they produce things that the community values more highly (higher a). The two 
programs have similar labor intensities, are roughly the same size on average, and neither 
generates private funds. The main difference is in the higher l for the PILOT projects, 
but the other differences are important because they are multiplicative within our 
framework. Note again that the only downside to good targeting is that an untargeted 20 
project is more efficient at transferring to the poor. Nevertheless, the two PILOT projects 
still manage to outperform the untargeted project. 
What are the key factors in determining some of these performance indicators? 
For example, how much of a program’s success is due to the asset it chooses to generate? 
Or to the institutional incentives embodied in implementing and financing arrangements? 
These are questions that require a multivariate analysis, with due attention to endogeneity 
and unobserved heterogeneity and are being taken up by Besley et al. (1999). We can 
begin to address this issue, however, with Table 5, which is similar to Table 4, but broken 
down by asset type. The table shows that the performance of the different projects by 
asset type is similar, except for the road and bridge projects that only outperform the 
untargeted transfer (with a 20 percent overhead) 63 percent of the time. Why is this? 
They have low leakage to the nonpoor so wages are set lower than market, but l is 
relatively low, indicating their location in better-off districts, and this is confirmed by the 
low value of NW/W, which indicates location in a higher than average employment area. 
Interestingly, the poverty rate of the districts in which these projects are located is not the 
lowest (as indicated by the rands necessary to transfer one rand to the poor via an 
untargeted transfer) of the five asset types, and this reminds us that poverty, average 
income levels, and unemployment are not perfectly correlated, at least at the district level. 
Interestingly, the cleanup and water/sanitation projects do equally well in outperforming 
the untargeted transfer, but they have very different labor intensities (0.69 versus 0.37, 
respectively). 21 
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We have examined the ability of 101 public works projects in the Western Cape 
of South Africa to transfer resources to the poor. The projects represent the universe of 
such projects in 1995-1997 with a set of objectives that mirror those of the NPWP. These 
objectives include short-term job creation; the creation of assets or environmental 
improvement via labor-intensive means; sustainable job creation through skills training;, 
and local institutional capacity building and community empowerment through 
participation in infrastructure projects. 
We applied Ravallion’s (1999) framework for appraising public works projects to 
the projects and fleshed it out in doing so. We were fortunate to have several detailed 
sources of quantitative and qualitative information at the project and district levels. 22 
Despite these data, we had to make a number of fairly crude assumptions as to some of 
the costs and benefits involved.  
Based on our assumptions, we find that between 83 percent and 92 percent of 
public works projects outperform an untargeted transfer scheme, depending on the 
scenario. Not surprisingly, the performance of the projects improves when a higher value 
is placed on a transfer from taxpayers to workers and when an administrative overhead is 
applied to the benchmark untargeted transfer. 
A number of lessons can be drawn from the analysis. First, the performance of 
public works projects as public-sector antipoverty initiatives vis-à-vis untargeted 
transfers depends on the interplay of many factors. Projects are more likely to perform 
well if they (1) offer wages that are lower than comparable market wages, (2) locate in 
areas that have a high unemployment rate among the poor, (3) have a labor intensity high 
enough to generate a sizeable transfer income, (4) create assets that generate nontransfer 
benefits valued by the poor, (5) locate in areas that are poor, but not so poor that an 
untargeted transfer is inevitable, and (6) leverage additional nongovernmental funding. 
However, the trade-offs between these factors are important to note. For example, 
if labor intensity is too high, not enough of the project budget will go to an asset that can 
generate nontransfer benefits. Similarly, if a project is located in an area in which nearly 
everyone is poor, an untargeted transfer might be more appropriate as a transfer program. 
At the province level, the ability of the programs to locate in relatively poor and 
unemployed areas is particularly crucial to their performance. Doing so reduces leakage 
of the transfer benefits to the nonpoor, increases the capture of nontransfer benefits by the 23 
poor, and increases the social value of transfers of income from taxpayer to worker. But 
Adato and Haddad (1999) find that for these projects, there is little relationship between 
the district level share of public works activity and the district level share of poverty, 
unemployment, and infrastructure need. This is despite the wide availability of repeated 
surveys of living standards in South Africa and is a reflection of the philosophy that the 
location of these projects should be community led. More developed communities are 
better connected and better able to apply for public works resources, hence, the trade-off 
with targeting objectives. 
Interestingly, the performance of the programs does not seem to depend overly on 
the type of asset that is constructed, although this is based purely on the bivariate 
comparisons in Table 5. If program characteristics are found to be important for the 
antipoverty performance of the projects, this has implications for the mechanisms that the 
government uses to select proposals for projects. For example, if projects led by 
community-based organizations were found to be more effective in transferring benefits 
to the poor, this could lead to an increased share of projects being awarded to 
community-led proposals. 
Second, we have shown the value of collecting a key set of indicators for project 
monitoring and evaluation purposes, including total costs, labor costs, duration, wage 
rates, number of days of employment, the number of project workers that leave for 
nonproject employment, and the area wage rate for comparable work. Such data 
collection protocols need to be developed by the programs. Also at the program level, 
poverty, employment, and infrastructure maps need to be generated and used when 24 
alternatives for project location present themselves. Unfortunately, such protocols that 
exist are generally inadequate and nonstandard. Moreover, few incentives exist for them 
to be adequately completed (Adato et al. 1999). 
Third, it is important to note that there are many limitations to our analysis. All 
the assumptions and guesses we have made are open to challenge. Moreover, we have 
focused on poverty reduction as our yardstick of performance, despite the other stated 
goals of the public works projects. In particular, our comparisons with hypothetical 
untargeted transfers do not consider the sizeable nontransfer benefits that are generated 
for the nonpoor by the assets the projects generate. Moreover, we have not been able to 
capture skills development and community empowerment effects that do affect the poor, 
except via our measure of a. Nevertheless, we have tried to make our guesses 
conservative and our assumptions based on our detailed knowledge of the area. We have 
had a database available to us that is much richer than any other such database we know 
of. We trust that others will simply merge quantitative project-level data with extant 
district-level data, reinforced and supplemented by qualitative data. In this way, the 
dialogue on the antipoverty effectiveness of public expenditures will be enriched, both 
within countries such as South Africa and within the wider international context. 25 
APPENDIX TABLE 
 
Table 6: Public works programs in Western Cape Province included in the study 





projects  Rural/urban 
Types of infrastructure and 
number of projects of each type 
 











Cleaning (2), greening, alien 
vegetation clearing (7), parking 
area (1) 
 









Community centre (4), roads (2), 
stormwater drainage (1), sanitation 






Public Works (DPW, 









Community centre (7), roads (1), 
stormwater drainage (1), sanitation 
(4), school (1), crèche (5), clinic 
(1), greening (1), roads and 
stormwater (1) 
 
Fynbos Water Conservation 
Project (FWCP) also known as 
the Fynbos Working for Water 
Project (WWP) 
 
Department of Water 







Alien vegetation clearing (14) 
 








Roads and stormwater (2) 
 






















Community centre (11), roads (1), 
stormwater drainage (2), sanitation 
(1), water supply (1), cleanup (3), 
recreation grounds (1), roads and 
stormwater (4), multiple services 
(4), bridge (1) 
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